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Abstract
A uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium of a dynamic game is a uniform
ε-equilibrium in an extended game, where the players observe a public
signal at every stage. We prove that a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium
exists in two classes of multiplayer absorbing games, thereby extending
earlier works by Solan and Solan (2019, 2018).
Keywords: stochastic games, absorbing games, spotted games, L-shaped
games, uniform equilibrium, sunspot equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Existence of uniform equilibrium in stochastic games has been a topic of
great interest in the last decades. Shapley (1953) introduced the model
of stochastic games, in which players’ actions affect both the stage payoff
and the state of the game. Shapley proved that every two-player zero-sum
stochastic game admits a λ-discounted equilibrium in stationary strategies,
for every λ > 0. This result was later extended for multiplayer stochastic
games by Fink (1964) and Takahashi (1964).
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#217/17.
†The School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997800, Israel.
e-mail: orin25@gmail.com, eilonsolan@gmail.com.
1
A strategy profile is a uniform ε-equilibrium if it is a λ-discounted ε-
equilibrium, for every discount factor λ sufficiently close to 0. Mertens and Neyman
(1981) proved that every two-player zero-sum stochastic game admits a uni-
form ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. It is a strategy profile in which each
player cannot gain more then ε by deviating from it, for every small enough λ.
Vieille (2000) extended this result to every two-player non-zero-sum stochas-
tic game. Solan (1999) proved the existence of a uniform ε-equilibrium in
three-player absorbing games. Solan and Vieille (2001) presented the class
of quitting games, and proved that if the payoffs satisfy a certain condition,
then a uniform ε-equilibrium exists. For additional results on the existence of
uniform ε-equilibrium in stochastic games, see Simon (2007, 2012, 2016). To
this day it is not known if every n-player stochastic game admits a uniform
ε-equilibrium.
A uniform correlated ε-equilibrium is a uniform ε-equilibrium in an ex-
tended game that includes a correlation device. Various versions of uniform
correlated ε-equilibrium have been studied, depending on the type of correla-
tion that the device allows. Solan and Vieille (2002) studied extensive-form
correlation devices. These are devices that send a private message to each
player in every stage. They proved that every multiplayer stochastic game
admits a uniform extensive-form correlated ε-equilibrium. Solan and Vohra
(2001, 2002) studied a normal-form correlation device, which sends one pri-
vate message to each player at the outset of the game. They proved that ev-
ery absorbing game1admits a uniform normal-form correlated ε-equilibrium.
Recently, Solan and Solan (2019, 2018) studied uniform sunspot ε-equilibria,
which are uniform ε-equilibria in an extended game that includes a device,
which sends a public message at every stage. They proved that every quit-
ting game, as well as every general quitting game2, admits a uniform sunspot
ε-equilibrium.
This paper is part of a project whose goal is to prove that every multi-
player stochastic game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium. Here we will
present two classes of absorbing games, spotted games and L-shaped games.
Both of these classes are generalizations of quitting games. In quitting games
there is a single non-absorbing entry. An absorbing game is spotted if every
1An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single non-absorbing state.
2A quitting game is an absorbing game where, in the non-absorbing state, each player
has two actions, continue and quit. As long as all players continue, the play remains in the
non-absorbing state; as soon as at least one player quits, the play moves with probability
1 to some absorbing state.
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two non-absorbing entries differ by the actions of at least two players. An
absorbing game is L-shaped if there are exactly three non-absorbing entries
a1, a2, and a3, and moreover, the action profiles a1 and a3 differ by the ac-
tion of Player 1 only, while the action profiles a1 and a2 differ by the action
of Player 2 only. We will show that every game in these classes admits a
uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main results are
described in Section 2. The proof of the main result for the first class pre-
sented, spotted games, appears in Section 3. The proof of the main result for
the second class presented, L-shaped games, appears in Section 4. Discussion
appears in Section 5.
2 Model and Main Results
2.1 Absorbing Games and General Quitting Games
In this paper we study stochastic games with a single non-absorbing state.
These games, called absorbing games, were first studied by Kohlberg (1974).
Definition 2.1 An absorbing game is a tuple Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u), where
• I = {1, 2, ..., |I|} is a non-empty finite set of players.
• For every player i, Ai is a non-empty finite set of actions. Denote the
set of all action profiles by A = ×i∈IAi.
• u : A→ [0, 1]I is a payoff function.
• P : A→ [0, 1]I is an absorption probability function.
The game proceeds as follows: At every stage t ∈ N, until absorption occurs,
each player i ∈ I chooses an action ati ∈ Ai, and receives the payoff ui(at),
where at := ×i∈Iati. With probability P (at), the game is absorbed and the
players’ payoff is u(at) in each subsequent stage. Otherwise, the game con-
tinues to the next stage.
An action profile a ∈ A is absorbing if P (a) > 0, and non-absorbing
if P (a) = 0. For a mixed action profile x ∈ ∆(A), we denote P (x) :=∑
a∈A x(a) · P (a).
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Solan and Solan (2018) defined a class of absorbing games, called general
quitting games. In this class of games, each player has two types of actions:
continue actions and quitting actions, and the game is absorbed as soon as
at least one player plays a quitting action.
Definition 2.2 An absorbing game Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) is a general quit-
ting game if for every player i ∈ I, the action set Ai can be divided into
two non-empty finite disjoint sets Ai = Ci ·∪ Qi that satisfy the following
condition: for every action profile a ∈ A, if aj ∈ Qj for some j ∈ I, then
P (a) = 1. Otherwise, a ∈ ×i∈ICi and P (a) = 0.
We will denote a general quitting game by Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u).
For every i ∈ I, the actions in Ci are called continue actions, and the actions
in Qi are called quitting actions.
Definition 2.3 An absorbing game is called generic if every two distinct
action profiles a 6= a′ ∈ A yield a different payoff for every player; that is,
ui(a) 6= ui(a′) for every i ∈ I.
Definition 2.4 An absorbing game Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) is recursive if every
non-absorbing action profile yields payoff 0; that is, for every a ∈ A, if
P (a) = 0 then u(a) = ~0.
Definition 2.5 A recursive absorbing game Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) is positive
if the payoff function is non-negative; that is, for every a ∈ A we have
ui(a) ≥ 0.
A special class of general quitting games is quitting games, previously
studied by Flesch et al. (1997) and Solan and Vieille (2001).
Definition 2.6 A general quitting game Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) is a
quitting game if |Ci| = |Qi| = 1 for every i ∈ I.
2.2 Strategies and Payoff
Definition 2.7 Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing game. A strategy
of player i in Γ is a function σi : ∪t∈NAt−1 → ∆(Ai). A strategy profile is a
vector σ = (σi)i∈I of strategies, one for each player.
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Definition 2.8 A strategy σi of player i is called stationary if it depends
solely on the current stage, and not on past play. Since absorbing games
have only one non-absorbing state, a stationary strategy of player i is equiv-
alent to a probability distribution in ∆(Ai). A strategy profile σ is called
ε-almost stationary if it is a stationary strategy, supplemented with threats
of punishment.
We will study the concept of uniform equilibrium. To this end, we present
the T -stage payoff, the discounted payoff, and the undiscounted payoff.
Definition 2.9 Let T ∈ N, and let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing
game. The T -stage payoff of player i in Γ under strategy profile σ is given
by
γTi (σ) :=
1
T
Eσ
[
T∑
t=1
ui(a
t)
]
.
Definition 2.10 Let λ ∈ (0, 1], and let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing
game. The λ-discounted payoff of player i in Γ under strategy profile σ is
given by
γλi (σ) := Eσ
[
∞∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1ui(at)
]
.
Definition 2.11 Let ε > 0 and let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing
game. A strategy profile σ is an ε-equilibrium if no player can increase her
payoff by more then ε by deviating from σ. That is, for every player i ∈ I
and every strategy σ′i of player i,
γλi (σ
′
i, σ−i) ≤ γλi (σ) + ε.
If this payoff function is a λ-discounted payoff for some λ ∈ [0, 1], then this
equilibrium is called λ-discounted ε-equilibrium. If this payoff function is a
T -stage payoff for some T ∈ N, then this equilibrium is called T -stage ε-
equilibrium.
Fink (1964) proved that for every λ ∈ (0, 1), every stochastic game, and
in particular, every absorbing game, admits a λ-discounted 0-equilibrium in
stationary strategies.
The concept of uniform ε-equilibrium was introduced by Mertens and Neyman
(1981).
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Definition 2.12 Let ε > 0. A strategy profile σ is a uniform ε-equilibrium
if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(ι) There exists λ0 ∈ (0, 1] such that σ is a λ-discounted ε-equilibrium for
every λ ∈ (0, λ0).
(ιι) There exists integer T0 ∈ N such that σ is a T -stage ε-equilibrium for
every T ≥ T0.
It follows from Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) that every two-player non-zero
sum absorbing game admits a uniform ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0. Solan
(1999) extended this result to every three-player absorbing game. To date
it is not known whether every four-player absorbing game admits a uniform
ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Definition 2.13 Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) be a positive recursive absorbing
game. The undiscounted payoff of player i in Γ under action profile strategy
σ, is defined by
γi(σ) := lim
t→∞
Eσ
[
ui(a
t)
]
:=
∑
a∈A
ui(a) · P (at = a | σ).
The equilibrium described in Definition 2.11 is called undiscounted ε-equilibrium
if the payoff function used in the definition is the undiscounted payoff. It
follows from Solan and Vieille (2001) that there is an equivalence between
uniform ε-equilibrium and undiscounted ε-equilibrium in positive recursive
absorbing games.
The following lemma allows us to focus on generic games. Though the
lemma is stated for the concept of uniform ε-equilibrium, it applies to all
notions of equilibrium that are mentioned in the paper.
Lemma 2.14 Let ε > 0, and let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) and Γ
′ =
(I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u
′) be two absorbing games with the same absorption
probability function. If ‖u− u′‖∞ ≤ ε, then a uniform ε-equilibrium of Γ is
a uniform 3ε-equilibrium of Γ′.
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2.3 Sunspot Equilibrium
We extend the game Γ by introducing a public correlation device: at the
beginning of every stage t ∈ N the players observe a public signal ζ t ∈ [0, 1]
that is drawn according to the uniform distribution, independently of past
signals and play. The extended game is denoted by Γsun. A strategy of player
i in the extended game Γsun is a measurable function ξi : ∪t∈N([0, 1]t×At−1)→
∆(Ai).
Definition 2.15 Every uniform ε-equilibrium of the game Γsun is called a
uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium of Γ.
The main goal of this paper is to study uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in
absorbing games.
2.4 Uniform Sunspot Equilibrium in General Quitting
Games
Solan and Solan (2018) proved the existence of a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium
in general quitting games in which every player has a single quitting action.
This result relies on linear complementarity problems, which we present now.
Definition 2.16 Given an n × n matrix R and a vector q ∈ Rn, the linear
complementarity problem LCP (R, q) is the following problem:
Find w ∈ Rn+, z ∈ ∆({0, 1, . . . , n})
such that w = z0 · q +R · (z1 . . . , zn)⊺,
zi = 0 or wi = Ri,i ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} .
Definition 2.17 An n×n matrix R is called a Q-matrix if for every q ∈ Rn
the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, q) has at least one solution.
Definition 2.18 If an n× n matrix R is not a Q-matrix, then a vector q ∈
R
n such that the linear complementarity problem LCP(R, q) has no solution,
is called a witness of R.
Definition 2.19 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be a general quitting game,
such that each player has a single quitting action; that is, |Qi| = 1 for ev-
ery i ∈ I. For every continue action profile c ∈ C, denote by R(Γ, c) the
(|I| × |I|)-matrix whose i’th column is u(qi, c−i).
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Theorem 2.20 (Solan and Solan, 2018) Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u)
be a positive recursive general quitting game, where Qi = {qi} for every player
i.
• If the matrix R(Γ, c) is not a Q-matrix for every action profile c ∈
×i∈I∆(Ci) of continue actions, then there is an absorbing stationary
strategy profile x such that for every ε > 0 the stationary strategy x,
supplemented with threats of punishment, is a uniform ε-equilibrium of
Γ.
• If the matrix R(Γ, c) is a Q-matrix for some action profile c ∈ ×i∈I∆(Ci)
of continue actions, then for every ε > 0 the game Γ admits a uniform
sunspot ε-equilibrium ξ in which, after every finite history, at most one
player i quits with positive probability, and does so with probability at
most ε, while all other players play c−i.
Theorem 2.20 is valid in the case where some players have no quitting actions,
as well as when the absorbing probabilities are smaller then 1, that is, P (a) ∈
(0, 1] whenever ai ∈ Qi for at least one player i ∈ I.
2.5 Quitting Absorbing Games
Quitting absorbing games are absorbing games where at least one player has
a quitting action.
Definition 2.21 An absorbing game Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , P, u) is called a quit-
ting absorbing game if for every i ∈ I, the set Ai can be divided into two
disjoint sets of continue actions and quitting actions, Ai = Ci ·∪Qi such that
• For every quitting action qi ∈ Qi and for every action profile a−i ∈ A−i,
P (qi, a−i) > 0.
• For every continue action ci ∈ ci there is a continue action profile
c−i ∈ ×j 6=iCj such that P (ci, c−i) = 0.
• There is at least one quitting action, namely ∪i∈IQi 6= φ.
We denote a quitting absorbing game by Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u). In
contrast to general quitting games, where the game continues with proba-
bility 1 as soon as no player plays a quitting action, in quitting absorbing
games the game may absorb in this case.
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2.6 Two-Dimensions Quitting Absorbing Games
We here define a simple class of quitting absorbing games, where two players
have two continue actions, while all other players have a single continue
action.
Definition 2.22 A two-dimension quitting absorbing game is a quitting ab-
sorbing game Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) that satisfies |C1| = |C2| = 2 and
|Ci| = 1 for every i > 2.
In two-dimension quitting absorbing games, up to equivalences, there are
6 possible absorption structures for action profiles in ×i∈ICi:
• All action profiles are absorbing. In this case the game is equivalent to
a one-shot game.
• There are three absorption structures for which the game is a general
quitting game, see Figure 1.
• There are two additional absorption structures, see Figures 2.
If the absorption structure of Γ is equivalent to that in Figure 2 (left), then
the game is called L-shaped. If the absorption structure of Γ is equivalent to
that in Figure 2 (right), then the game is called spotted.
C C Q
C *
C *
Q * * *
C C Q
C *
C * * *
Q * * *
C C Q
C * *
C * * *
Q * * *
Figure 1: Two-dimension quitting absorbing games that are general quitting
games.
Definition 2.23 An L-shaped game is a two-dimension quitting absorbing
game Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) with only one action profile a ∈ ×i∈ICi
such that P (a) > 0.
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C C Q
C *
C * *
Q * * *
C C Q
C * *
C * *
Q * * *
Figure 2: L-shaped game (left) and spotted game (right).
The game in Figure 2 (left) is an L-shaped game.
Definition 2.24 A spotted game is an absorbing game Γ = (I, A = ×i∈IAi, P, u)
such that every two distinct non-absorbing action profiles differ by at least
two coordinates. That is, if a 6= a′ ∈ A are two non-absorbing action profiles,
then there are i 6= j ∈ I such that ai 6= a′i and aj 6= a′j.
The game in Figure 2 (right) is a spotted game. We note that the definition
of spotted games relates to every absorbing game, and not necessarily to
two-dimension quitting absorbing games.
2.7 Main Results
The main results of the paper extend the existence of a uniform sunspot
ε-equilibrium to the two new classes of games, defined in Section 2.6.
Theorem 2.25 Every positive recursive spotted game admits a uniform sunspot
ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Section 3 is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2.25.
Theorem 2.26 Every positive recursive two-dimension quitting absorbing
game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
In view of Solan and Solan (2018) and Theorem 2.25, to prove Theorem
2.26 it is sufficient to prove the existence of a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium
in L-shaped two-dimension quitting absorbing games. This will be done in
Section 4.
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3 Spotted Games
In this section we prove Theorem 2.25. The proof is an adaptation of the
proof of Solan and Solan (2019). By Lemma 2.14, to prove that an absorbing
game admits a sunspot ε-equilibrium, we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that the game is generic.
Step 1: Constructing best response matrices
Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be a generic spotted game. For every non-
absorbing action profile a ∈ A and every player i ∈ I, the best absorbing
deviation of player i against a is bi(a) := argmaxa′i 6=ai u(a
′
i, a−i). Since the
game is spotted, all deviations of each player i from a are absorbing. Since
the game is generic, the best absorbing deviation is uniquely defined. Let
ri(a) := u(bi(a), a−i). This is the payoff vector when player i optimally
deviates from a. Let R(a) be the |I| × |I| matrix whose i-th column is ri(a).
One of the following two conditions must hold:
(E.1) R(a) is a Q-matrix for some non-absorbing action profile a ∈ A.
(E.2) R(a) is not a Q-matrix for every non-absorbing action profile a ∈ A.
Step 2: Case (E.1) yields a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium
Let a′ ∈ A be such that R(a′) is a Q-matrix. We show that in this case a
sunspot ε-equilibrium exists for every ε > 0. Construct an auxiliary general
quitting game Γ(a′) = (I, (C ′i)i∈I , (Q
′
i)i∈I , P
′, u), where C ′i = {a′i}, Q′i =
Ai \ {a′i}, and
P ′(a) :=

P (a) if P (a) > 0,
0 if a = a′,
1 otherwise.
By Theorem 2.20, the game Γ(a′) admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium ξ,
where all players play the action profile a′ ∈ A, and in each stage only one
player plays the best absorbing deviation with a positive probability. The
reader can verify that the strategy profile ξ is a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium
in Γ as well, since the best deviations from a′ in both games Γ and Γ(a′) are
the same.
Step 3: Case (E.2) yields a stationary uniform ε-equilibrium
The condition implies that for every non-absorbing action profile a ∈ A
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there is a vector qa ∈ RI such that the linear complementarity problem
LCP(R(a), qa) has no solution. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, û) be the auxil-
iary spotted game that is identical to Γ, except for the payoff at non-absorbing
action profiles:
û(a) :=
{
u(a) if P (a) > 0,
qa if P (a) = 0.
For every λ ∈ (0, 1] let xλ be a stationary λ-discounted equilibrium of Γ̂,
such that the limit x0 := limλ→0 x
λ exists. As in Solan and Solan (2019),
because R(a) is not a Q-matrix for every non-absorbing action profile, x0
must be absorbing. Moreover, x0 is a stationary uniform ε-equilibrium for
every ε > 0.
4 The L-Shaped Game
In this section we prove the following result, which, together with Theorem
2.25 and Theorem 2.20, implies Theorem 2.26.
Lemma 4.1 Every positive recursive L-shaped game admits a uniform sunspot
ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
Throughout the section we will denote the two continue actions of Play-
ers 1 and 2 by C1 = {c11, c21}, C2 = {c12, c22}, respectively, and assume that
P (c21, c
2
2, c3, ..., c|I|) > 0. We will use the following notations:
a1 := (c11, c
1
2, c3, ...c|I|), a
2 := (c11, c
2
2, c3, ...c|I|),
a3 := (c21, c
1
2, c3, ...c|I|), and a
4 := (c21, c
2
2, c3, ...c|I|).
c12 c
2
2 q2
c11 a
1 a2 *
c21 a
3 a4 * *
q1 * * *
Figure 3: An L-shaped game.
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4.1 Auxiliary Games
We start by introducing a collection of auxiliary games that are derived
from the L-shaped game by turning some non-absorbing action profiles into
absorbing action profiles.
Definition 4.2 Let δ1, δ2 ∈ [0, 1] and let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be an
L-shaped game. Let Γδ1,δ2 = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P
δ1,δ2 , uδ1,δ2) be the quitting
absorbing game that is defined as follows (see Figure 4):
• P δ1,δ2(a2) := δ2 and P δ1,δ2(a3) := δ1.
• If δ2 > 0 then uδ1,δ2(a2) := u(a4). Otherwise uδ1,δ2(a2) := u(a2).
• If δ1 > 0 then uδ1,δ2(a3) := u(a4). Otherwise uδ1,δ2(a3) := u(a3).
• For every action profile a ∈ A such that a 6= a2, a3, we set P δ1,δ2(a) :=
P (a) and uδ1,δ2(a) := u(a).
In other words, the auxiliary game Γδ1,δ2 is similar to Γ, but we turn one
or two action profiles to absorbing, with absorbing payoff that is equal to
u(a4). The auxiliary game Γδ1,δ2 is a quitting game if δ1, δ2 > 0 and a general
quitting game if max {δ1, δ2} > 0.
c12 c
2
2 q2
c11 *
c21 u(a
4) * *
q1 * * *
c12 c
2
2 q2
c11 u(a
4) δ2* *
c21 u(a
4) δ1* u(a4) * *
q1 * * *
Figure 4: An L-shaped game Γ (left) and the auxiliary game Γδ1,δ2 (right).
We will denote the min-max value of player i in the absorbing game
Γ by vi(Γ) := minσi maxσ−i γi(σi, σ−i) This is a lower bound on player i’s
equilibrium payoff. We will prove that the min-max value of each player
in the auxiliary game is not lower by much than her min-max value in the
original game. To this end we need the following result.
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Lemma 4.3 Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I , u, P ) be a positive recursive quitting absorb-
ing game. Fix a player i ∈ I, such that |Qi| > 0. For every ε > 0 there exists
Tε ∈ N such that for every strategy profile x−i there is a pure strategy ai of
player i such that
• The payoff under (ai, x−i) is high: γi(ai, x−i) ≥ vi(Γ)− ε.
• The probability of absorption up to time Tε under (ai, x−i) is high:
Pai.x−i(Γ is absorbed in the first Tε stages) ≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Since the game is positive recursive, and since player i can obtain
a positive payoff by quitting, then the min-max value of player i is positive,
that is, vi(Γ) > 0. Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small.
Let x−i ∈ ×j 6=iCj be a strategy profile such that under (ai, x−i) the play never
absorbs, for every continue action action ci ∈ Ci of player i. Since vi(Γ) > 0,
it follows that there is a quitting action qi ∈ Qi such that γi(qi, x−i) ≥ vi(Γ).
It follows that γi(qi, x
′
−i) ≥ vi(Γ) − ε for every strategy profile x′−i that
satisfies
∥∥x−i − x′−i∥∥∞ ≤ ε. We deduce that there is a quitting action qi ∈ Qi
satisfies the requirements with Tε = 1, for every strategy profile x
′
−i for which
P(absorption | (ai, x′−i)) ≤ ε for every ai ∈ Ai.
Let x−i be a strategy profile such that for some continue action ci ∈ Ci
of player i, under (ci, x−i) the game absorbs. Then one of the following
conditions holds:
• Player i has a quitting action q′i ∈ Qi such that γi(qi, x−i) ≥ vi(Γ)− ε.
• For every quitting action qi ∈ Qi of player i, γi(qi, x−i) < vi(Γ)− ε and
there is a continue action ci ∈ Ci such that P(absorption | ci, x−i) ≥ ε.
In the first case, it follows that the quitting action q′i ∈ Qi satisfies the
requirements with Tε = 1 against x−i. In the latter case, it follows that
γi(ai, x−i) ≥ vi(Γ). We deduce that the continue action ci satisfies the re-
quirements with Tε =
1
ε2
.
Lemma 4.4 Let Γ be a quitting absorbing game. Then for every ε > 0, there
are δ′1, δ
′
2 > 0, such that for every δ1 ∈ [0, δ′1), δ2 ∈ [0, δ′2), and every player i
we have:
vi(Γ
δ1,δ2) ≥ vi(Γ)− ε.
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Proof. Let i ∈ I. Since the game is positive and recursive, if |Qi| = 0 then
vi(Γ
δ1,δ2) ≥ 0 = vi(Γ).
Then assume |Qi| > 0. Let ε > 0 and choose ε′ ≤ ε4 . Let σi and T be,
respectively, the strategy and the integer given by Lemma 4.3, with respect
to player i and ε′ in the game Γ. Denote δ′ = ε
′
2T
, and fix δ1, δ2 < δ
′. Hence
T · (δ1 + δ2) ≤ ε′.
If player i follows σi in the game Γ
δ1,δ2 , then with probability larger than
1− ε′−T · δ1−T · δ2, the game is absorbed in the first T stages by an action
profile that is absorbing in Γ as well. Denote by γδ1,δ2i (σ) the payoff of player
i in Γδ1,δ2 under σ. Then, since payoffs are bounded by 1,
γδ1,δ2i (σi, σ−i) ≥ (1− ǫ′ − T · δ1 − T · δ2) · γi(σi, σ−i | absorption at the first T stages)
≥ (1− ε′ − T · (δ1 + δ2)) · (vi(Γ)− 2 · ε′)
≥ vi(Γ)− ε′ − ε
4
− 2 · ε′
≥ vi(Γ)− 4 · ε
4
= vi(Γ)− ε
4.2 Characterization of L-shaped games
In this section we divide L-shaped games into two classes of games. This par-
tition is analogous to the one given in Theorem 2.20. We start by generalize
the definition of best response matrix, presented in Definition 2.19.
Definition 4.5 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , u) be a general quitting game,
and let c ∈ ×i∈I∆(CI) be a profile of mixed continue actions. The matrix R
is a best response matrix to c if R is a (|I| × |I|)-matrix whose i’th column
is u(qi, c−i), where qi ∈ ∆(Qi) is a best quitting response to c−i, that is,
qi ∈ argmax∆(Qi) ui(qi, c−i). Denote by R(Γ, c) the set of all best response
matrices to the mixed action profile c in the game Γ.
Observation 4.6 Let δ1, δ2 ∈ [0, 1), and let α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1). If the matrix R
is a best response matrix of Γδ1,δ2, then R is also a best response matrix of
Γα1δ1,α2δ2.
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Definition 4.7 An L-shaped game is called a QL game if there are δ1, δ2 ∈
[0, 1) such that max {δ1, δ2} > 0 and at least one of the best response matrices
of Γδ1,δ2 is a Q-matrix.
Definition 4.8 An L-shaped game is called an NQL (non-Q L-shaped) game
if the following sets do not contain a Q-matrix:
(NQ1) R(Γ1,0, c)
(NQ2) R(Γ0,1, c)
(NQ3) R(Γ1,1, c)
where c = (c11, c
1
2, c
3, . . . , c|I|).
Obviously, every L-shaped game is either a QL game, an NQL game, or both.
Section 4.3 will be dedicated to discuss QL games, while section 4.5 will be
dedicated to discuss NQL games.
4.3 QL Games
In this section we prove that QL games admit uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium,
for every ε > 0. The proof is similar to the proof of the analogous result for
general quitting games, which was stated as Theorem 2.20.
Lemma 4.9 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be a QL game. Then for ev-
ery δ1, δ2 ∈ (0, 1], at least one of the games Γδ1,δ2, Γδ1,0, and Γ0,δ2, admits
a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium. Moreover, in that game, there is a con-
tinue mixed action profile c ∈ C, such that at each stage of the sunspot
ε-equilibrium, at most one player i quits with positive probability, and does
so with probability at most ε, while all other players follow c−i.
Proof. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ (0, 1]. Since Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) is a QL game,
according to Observation 4.6, at least one of the games Γδ1,δ2, Γδ1,0, and Γ0,δ2 ,
admits a best response matrix R which is a Q-matrix. Denote this game by
Γ′. By Theorem 2.20, the auxiliary game Γ′ admits a uniform sunspot ε-
equilibrium of the desired form.
Lemma 4.10 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be a QL game. Then Γ ad-
mits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0.
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Proof. Fix ε > 0. By Lemma 4.9, there are δ1, δ2 ∈ [0, 1] such that
max {δ1, δ2} > 0 and the auxiliary game Γδ1,δ2 = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P δ1,δ2, uδ1,δ2)
admits a sunspot ε
2
-equilibrium ξ. Assume without lost of generality that
δ1 > 0. The strategy profile ξ is determined by a continue mixed action
profile cξ ∈ C, such that at each stage of ξ, at most one player i quits with
positive probability, and does so with probability at most ε
2
, while all other
players follow cξ−i.
More formally, ξ has the following structure: Let cξ be the continue mixed
action profile from Lemma 4.9. The continue mixed action of Player 2 in this
action profile is cξ2 := pc
1
2 + (1 − p)c22, where if δ2 > 0 then p = 0. For every
t ∈ N, a player it ∈ I is chosen by the correlation device, alongside a quitting
action qtit ∈ Qi, an integer Mt ∈ N, and a deviation αt ∈ (0, ε2). For the
next Mt stages, player it plays αtq
t
it
+(1−αt)cξit , while all other players play
cξ−it . The auxiliary game Γδ1,δ2 is absorbing during these Mt stages with a
probability of ρδ1,δ2(q
t
it
, cξ, αt,Mt) := 1 − (1 − αt · P δ1,δ2(qtit , cξ−it))Mt . If the
game is not absorb, then it+1 ∈ I, qt+1it+1 ∈ Qi, Mt+1 ∈ N, and αt+1 ∈ (0, ε2)
are chosen by the correlation device, and the process is continue.
We will construct a sunspot strategy profile ξ̂ in Γ that mimics ξ as
follows. The idea is that the strategy profile ξ̂ coincides with ξ until it is
Player 1’s turn to play the quitting action c21 with small probability. Then,
we will expand this turn into many stages, and let Player 2 play c22 with
at least small probability as well. On one hand, Player 2 will play c22 with
small probability so that no other player can gain more than ε by deviating.
On the other hand, we will repeat this play for many stages so that all the
other players can monitor Player 2. The probability of Players 1 and 2 to play
simultaneity c21 and c
2
2 in these stages will be equal to the quitting probability
of Player 1 quitting with c21 in the original equilibrium of the auxiliary game.
If δ2 > 0 as well, the symmetric process takes place when in ξ̂ it is Player 2
turn to quit with action c22.
Formally, the sunspot strategy profile ξ̂ has the same structure as ξ: For
every t ∈ N, a player ît ∈ I is chosen by the correlation device, alongside
a quitting action qt
ît
∈ Qi, an integer M̂t ∈ N, and a deviation α̂t ∈ (0, ε2).
Player ît quits with probability α̂t using q
t
ît
for M̂t, while all the other players
play a continue action. If the game is not absorb, then ît+1 ∈ I, qt+1ît+1 ∈ Qi,
M̂t+1 ∈ N, and α̂t+1 ∈ (0, ε2) are chosen by the correlation device, and the
process is continue. Denote by ρ(qi, c, α,M) := 1 − (1 − α · P (qi, c−i))M the
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probability of the game Γ to absorb when player i plays the quitting action
qi with probability α and the rest of the players play c−i for M stages. Note
that if qi 6= c21, c22 then ρ(qi, c,α,M) = ρδ1,δ2(qi, c, α,M), and that the payoff
when this absorption occurs is equal, that is u(qi, c−2) = uδ1,δ2(qi, c−2).
The fashion of choosing ît and q
t
ît
in ξ̂ is identical to the fashion of choosing
it and q
t
it
in ξ. If qt
ît
6= c21, c22, then M̂t and α̂t are evaluate from ît, qtît , and
the correlation device that same way Mt and αt are evaluate from it, q
t
it
, and
the correlation device.
We now construct M̂t and α̂t out of Mt and αt when q
t
ît
= c21. Let
p = max
{
cξ2(c
2
2),
ε
2
}
, ĉ2 := pc
1
2 + (1 − p)c22, and ĉξ,2 := (ĉ2, cξ−2). The func-
tion ρ(c21, ĉ
ξ,2, αt,M) is increasing on M . Then, there is an integer M̂t ≥ Mt
such that M̂t is large enough to monitor between ĉ
ξ,2
2 and (1− ε)pc12 + ((1−
p) + εp)c22, and ρ(c
2
1, ĉ
ξ,2, αt, M̂t) ≥ ρδ1,δ2(c21, cξ, αt,Mt). ρ(c21, ĉξ,2, α, M̂t) is
decreasing on α. Then, there is 0 < α̂t ≤ αt, such that ρ(c21, ĉξ,2, α̂t, M̂t) =
ρδ1,δ2(c
2
1, c
ξ, αt,Mt). Note that if ξ̂ is terminate after choosing quitting action
c21, then the payoff is u(a
4) = uδ1,δ2(a3), which is the payoff if ξ is terminate
after choosing quitting action c21. Therefore, if the correlation device choose
quitting action c21 at time t, the the sunspot strategy profiles ξ and ξ̂ termi-
nates at the same probability before time t+1, and yields the same payoff if
they terminate. We repeat this calculation for quitting action c22, if needed.
Thus, we created a process given by ξ̂, which is similar to the process
given by ξ in the following way - For every t ∈ dN , the probability of the
process to be terminate after t stages, is equal. Moreover, if the processes
are terminated after time t, the payoff they yield are equal. For every player
i ≥ 3, the only new deviations are given due the change between cξ to ĉξ,2
and ĉξ,1. But, |cξ − ĉξ,2|, |cξ − ĉξ,1| ≤ ε
2
, then any deviation of a player in ξ̂ is
bounded by ε
2
+ ε
2
. For Players 1 and 2, the only new deviation is not playing
ĉξ,22 and ĉ
ξ,1
1 respectively when needed. But, they are being monitored for
lowering the probability for termination of the game by more then ε, while
they have no incentive to boost this probability (since they can quit in ξ as
well). Therefore, their deviation has no more then ε influence. Therefore, ξ̂
is a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium.
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4.4 Additional Family of Auxiliary Games
In this section we define a second family of auxiliary games, which are similar
to the auxiliary games Γδ1,δ2 , with an additional property that one of the
players is restricted in the mixed action he can play.
Definition 4.11 Let δ > 0 and let α ∈ [0, 1]. Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u)
be an L-shaped game, and let Γδ,0 = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P
δ,0, uδ,0) be an aux-
iliary game of Γ. The auxiliary game Γδ,0α is defined similarly to Γ
δ,0 with the
following change: Player 2 cannot play the action c22 with probability greater
then α.
The auxiliary game Γ0,δα is defined analogously to the auxiliary game Γ
δ,0
α ,
with Player 1 and action c21 replacing the role of Player 2 and action c
2
2. Both
games Γ0,δ0 and Γ
δ,0
0 are quitting games if δ > 0, and general quitting games
for every δ ≥ 0.
Definition 4.12 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be an absorbing game. Let
a ∈ A be an action profile and let x ∈ ×i∈I∆(Ai) be a mixed action profile.
The per-stage probability of absorption by action profile a under x in Γ is
denoted by
χ(a, x) := x(a) · P (a).
For every subset of action profiles A′ ⊆ A, denote the per-stage probability
of absorption by A′ under x in Γ by
χ(A′, x) :=
∑
a∈A′
χ(a, x).
For every mixed action profile x with P (x) > 0, the undiscounted payoff
under x in Γ is denote by
γ(x) :=
∑
a∈A
χ(a, x)
P (x)
u(a),
where P (x) =
∑
a∈A χ(a, x) = χ(A, x) is the per-stage probability of absorp-
tion under x in Γ.
The following lemma provides a condition for the existence of an almost
stationary uniform ε-equilibrium.
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Lemma 4.13 Let Γ be a generic L-shaped game. For every ε > 0 there
exist δε, cε > 0, such that if δ < δε, α ∈ [0, 1], and the mixed action x is a
stationary equilibrium of Γδ,0α that satisfies 0 < P
1,0(x) < cε, then Γ admits
an almost stationary uniform ε-equilibrium,
Proof. Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be a generic L-shaped game. Fix
ε > 0. We will prove that Γ admits a almost stationary uniform 18ε-
equilibrium.
Step 1: Notations
For every δ > 0, let Γδ,0 = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P
δ,0, uδ,0) be its auxiliary game.
Denote by γδ,0(x) the undiscounted payoff of this auxiliary game. In this
proof, we will refer c21 as a quitting action. That is, the quitting actions in
the game are
Q′i :=
{
Q1 ∪
{
c21
}
i = 1,
Qi i ≥ 2,
and the continue actions are
C ′i :=

{
c11
}
i = 1,{
c12, c
2
2
}
i = 2,
{c3} i ≥ 3.
Thus, Player 2 is the only player to have two continue actions, while all other
players have a single continue action. Denote all action profiles that contain
a single quitting action by
A1 :=
{
a ∈ A | ∃i ∈ I.ai ∈ Q′i, a−i ∈ ×j 6=iC ′j
}
.
Denote A˜1 := A1 \ {a3, a4}, and denote all action profiles that contain more
then a single quitting action by
A>1 := A \ (A1 ∪ {a1, a2}) .
Since 0 < P 1,0(x), it follows that 0 < P δ,0(x), and x is absorbing in Γδ,0.
20
Therefore,
γδ,0(x) =
∑
a∈A1
χδ,0(a, x)
P δ,0(x)
uδ,0(a) +
∑
a∈A>1
χδ,0(a, x)
P δ,0(x)
uδ,0(a)
=
χδ,0(a3, x)
P δ,0(x)
uδ,0(a3) +
∑
a∈A1\{a3}
χδ,0(a, x)
P δ,0(x)
uδ,0(a) +
∑
a∈A>1
χδ,0(a, x)
P δ,0(x)
uδ,0(a)
=
χδ,0({a3, a4} , x)
P δ,0(x)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x)
P δ,0(x)
u(a) +
∑
a∈A>1
χ(a, x)
P δ,0(x)
u(a).
Define pmin := min {P (a) | a ∈ A, a 6= a1, a2, a3}. Since by assumption P δ,0(x) <
cε, it follows that for every player i ∈ I and every quitting action qi ∈ Q′i,
we have xi(qi) <
cε
pmin
. We will define a mixed action profile such that it is
an almost stationary uniform 18ε-equilibrium in Γ.
Step 2: Influence of the action profiles in A>1 on the undis-
counted payoff is negligible
First, we prove that there is c′ε such that for every mixed action profile y,
if yi(qi) < c
′
ε for every quitting action qi of player i, for every i ∈ I, then
χ(A>1, y)
P (y)
< ε.
Note that 1 − P (y) ≥ (1 − c′ε)|Q′|. Let qi ∈ Q′i be a quitting action of player
i, such that qi 6= c21. We can bound from below the probability of player i to
quit alone using qi by
χ(
{
(qi, a
1
−i), (qi, a
2
−i)
}
, y) ≥ y(qi) · (1− c′ε)|Q
′| · pmin.
Denote the quitting action profile that includes player i quitting with qi while
other players quit as well by
A(qi) :=
{
a ∈ A | ∃j 6= i.aj ∈ Q′j , ai = qi
}
.
We can bound from above the probability of player i to using qi alongside
other players quitting by
χ(A(qi), y) ≤ y(qi) · c
′
ε
pmin
· |A|.
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Therefore, if c′ε ≤ min
{
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
,
p2min · ε
2|A|
}
, it follows that
χ(
{
(qi, a
1
−i), (qi, a
2
−i)
}
, y) · ε ≥ χ(A(qi), y).
Since it is true for every qi 6= c21 ∈ Qi, we deduce χ(A>1, y) < ε · P (y), as we
wanted.
We can now approximate the undiscounted payoff of a mixed action profile
with a small per-stage probability of absorbing. Let x˜ be a strategy profile
that satisfies
P (x˜) ≤ min
{
pmin
(
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
)
,
p3min · ε
2|A|
}
,
then χ(A>1, x˜) < ε · P (x˜). We can conclude these two boundaries of γ(x˜).
The first is an upper bound,
γ(x˜) =
χ({a3, a4} , x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a) +
∑
a∈A>1
χ(a, x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a)
≤ χ({a
3, a4} , x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a) + ε
≤ χ({a
3, a4} , x˜)
χ(A1, x˜)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x˜)
χ(A1, x˜)
u(a) + ε, (1)
and the second is a lower bound,
γ(x˜) =
χ({a3, a4} , x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a) +
∑
a∈A>1
χ(a, x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a)
≥ χ({a
3, a4} , x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x˜)
P (x˜)
u(a)
≥ χ({a
3, a4} , x˜)
χ(A1, x˜)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x˜)
χ(A1, x˜)
u(a)− ε. (2)
Step 3: Variant of Step 2 for an action deviation
We will prove a similar estimate as in Step 2, for a different mixed ac-
tion profile: Let i ∈ I be a player, and let qi ∈ Qi be a quitting ac-
tion of player i. Let y be a mixed action profile such that y(q′) < c′ε
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for every q′ 6= qi ∈ Q. We repeat the process as in Step 2. We know
that χ(
{
(qi, a
1
−i), (qi, a
2
−i)
}
, y) ≥ y(qi) · (1 − c′ε)|Q′| · pmin and χ(A(qi), y) ≤
y(qi) · c′εpmin · |A|. If c′ε ≤ min
{
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
,
p2min · ε
2|A|
}
we deduce that
χ(
{
(qi, a
1
−i), (qi, a
2
−i)
}
, y) · ε ≥ χ(A(qi), y). (3)
Denote the quitting action profile that includes player j quitting with qj
while other players quit as well, but player i does not quit using qi, by
A(qj ; qi) := {a ∈ A | ∃k 6= j.ak ∈ Q′k, aj = qj, ai 6= qi} .
If c′ε ≤ min
{
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
,
p2min · ε
2|A|
}
, we deduce that
χ(
{
(qi, a
1
−i), (qi, a
2
−i)
}
, y) · ε ≥ χ(A(qi), y) (4)
From both Eqs. (3) and (4) we can deduce again that if c′ε < min
{
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
,
p2min · ε
2|A|
}
then
χ(A>1, y) < ε · P (y).
Hence, if x˜ is a mixed action profile such that P (x˜) < min
{
pmin
(
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
)
,
p3min · ε
2|A|
}
,
and qi ∈ Qi is a quitting action of player i such that qi 6= c21, then
χ(A>1, (qi, x˜−i)) < ε · P (qi, x˜−i).
Therefore ∑
a∈A>1
χ(a, (qi, x˜−i))
P (qi, x˜−i)
u(a) < ε.
From Step 2, we get that if ci ∈ Ci is a continue action, then∑
a∈A>1
χ(a, (ci, x˜−i))
P (ci, x˜−i)
u(a) < ε.
We conclude that for every deviation ai ∈ Ai such that ai 6= c21, we have
23
these two inequalities. The first is an upper bound of γ(ai, x˜−i)
γ(ai, x˜−i) =
χ({a3, a4} , (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a) (5)
+
∑
a∈A>1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a)
≤ χ({a
3, a4} , (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a) + ε
≤ χ({a
3, a4} , (ai, x˜−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x˜−i))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x˜−i))
u(a) + ε,
while the second is a lower bound of γ(ai, x˜−i)
γ(ai, x˜−i) =
χ({a3, a4} , (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a) (6)
+
∑
a∈A>1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a)
≥ χ({a
3, a4} , (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
P (ai, x˜−i)
u(a)
≥ χ({a
3, a4} , (ai, x˜−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x˜−i))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x˜−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x˜−i))
u(a)− ε
Step 4: Constructing an auxiliary mixed action profile x̂δ
We define a mixed action profile x̂δ as follows,
x̂δ2(c
1
2) := (1− δ) · x2(c12),
x̂δ2(c
2
2) := x
′
2(c
2
2) + δ · x2(c12),
x̂δ2(q2) := x2(q2) for every q2 ∈ Q2,
x̂δ2(q2) := x2(q2) for every i 6= 2, ai ∈ Ai.
In words, in x̂δ, Player 2 increases the probability of playing the action c22
at the expense of the action c12. Note that χ
δ,0({a3, a4} , x) = χ(a4, x̂δ). We
conclude that if cε, δ < min
{
pmin
2
(
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
)
,
p3min · ε
4|A|
}
, then P (x̂δ) <
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min
{
pmin
(
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
)
,
p3min · ε
2|A|
}
. Therefore, Eqs. (1) and (2) hold for the
mixed action profile x̂δ, and Eqs. (5) and (6) hold for every action deviation
of x̂δ.
Note that for every mixed action profile y, and every two action profiles
a, a′ ∈ A˜1 such that a−2 = a′−2, a2 = c12, and a′2 = c22, we have∣∣∣∣χδ,0({a, a′} , y)χ({a, a′} , ŷδ) − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
Therefore, we deduce that∣∣∣∣∣ χ({a4} , ŷδ)χ(A1, ŷδ) u(a4) +∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, ŷδ)
χ(A1, ŷδ)
u(a) (7)
−χ
δ,0({a3, a4} , y)
χδ,0(A1, y)
u(a4) −
∑
a∈A˜1
χδ,0(a, y)
χδ,0(A1, y)
u(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3δ
Step 5: Constructing an auxiliary mixed action profile x̂δ,η
Let η > 0. We here define x̂δ,η, a mixed action profile which is a variant of
x̂δ. Denote the maximal probability in which a player plays a quitting action
under x by xmax := max {xi(qi) | i ∈ I, qi ∈ Q′i}. We will define action profile
which presents the relative weight of playing the quitting actions in ∪i∈IQi,
while ensuring that each quitting action is played with probability at most
η.
If η ≥ xmax, then define x̂δ,η := x̂δ. Otherwise, for every i ∈ I such that
i 6= 2, define
x̂δ,ηi (ai) :=

η
xmax
· x̂δi (ai) if ai ∈ Q′i,
1−
∑
qi∈Q′i
x̂δ,ηi (qi) if ai ∈ C ′i.
For every quitting action q2 ∈ Q′2 of Player 2, define
x̂δ,η2 (q2) :=
η
xmax
· x̂δ2(q2),
and for the continue actions c12 and c
2
2, define x̂
δ,η
2 to satisfy the following two
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equations:
x̂δ,η2 (c
1
2) + x̂
δ,η
2 (c
2
2) = 1−
∑
q2∈Q′2
x̂δ,η2 (q2), (8)
x̂δ,η2 (c
1
2)
x̂δ,η2 (c
1
2) + x̂
δ,η
2 (c
2
2)
=
x̂δ2(c
1
2)
x̂δ2(c
1
2) + x̂
δ
2(c
2
2)
. (9)
Eq. (8) ensures that x̂δ,η2 is a mixed action profile, while Eq. (9) ensures that
while Player 2 plays continue actions, the ratio of the probabilities to play
the continue actions c12 and c
2
2 under x̂
δ and under x̂δ,η are the same. For
every η > 0, every mixed action profile y, and every auxiliary mixed action
profile yη, we have
χ({a3, a4} , yη)
χ(A1, yη)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, yη)
χ(A1, yη)
u(a) =
=
χ({a3, a4} , y)
χ(A1, y)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, y)
χ(A1, y)
u(a) (10)
Note that if cε, δ < min
{
pmin
2
(
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
)
,
p3min · ε
4|A|
}
, then Eqs. (1), (2),
(5), (6), and (7) hold for x̂δ,η.
Step 6: Statistical tests
We constructed a stationary strategy profile that is absorbing at every stage
with low probability. Under this stationary strategy profile, Player 2 plays
both actions c12 and c
2
2 with positive probability, and he may profit by in-
creasing the frequency in which he plays one of the actions at the expense of
the other. To deter such detections, we add statistical tests to the strategy
profile.
If all players play non-absorbing stationary mixed action, they can verify
whether a deviation by one of the players occur, using statistical test on the
realized strategies. By Solan (1999, Section 5.3), if stationary mixed action
profile absorbs with a small probability in each turn, then this statistical test
can still be uphold. That is, for our case, for stationary mixed action and
every ε′ > 0, there is η(ε′) > 0 such that if the game absorb with probability
smaller then η(ε′) in each turn, then the players determine if player i play the
continue mixture yi, or deviate from it by more then ε
′. Formally, for every
ε′ > 0, there is an integer Tε′ ∈ N, such that if {xm}m∈N are i.i.d. Bernoulli
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random variables with parameter x, then their average, after at least time
Tε′, from x is small enough. That is,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣
∑T
m=1 xm
T
− x
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε′ for some T ≥ Tε′
)
≤ ε′.
Let η(δ · ε) > 0 be the constant related to δ · ε, and set η′ := η(δ · ε)|A| .
Therefore, the players can identifying a deviation of Player 2 from x̂δ,η
′
, in
scale of δ · ε.
Let η ≤ η′. Define by σδ,η a strategy similar to x̂δ,η, with the addition
of statistical test by Players 1, 3, 4, . . . , |I| whether the realized actions of
Player 2 up to time T are close to x̂δ,η2 , for every large enough T . We will
show that if every player i ∈ I cannot gain more then ε by deviating from
σδ,η to action ai ∈ Ai such then ai /∈ C ′2, then Player 2 cannot gain more
then 2ε by changing the distribution of her continue actions. We assumed
that every quitting action q2 ∈ Q2 is less than an ε-efficient deviation against
x̂δ,η−2. Let C−2 := c
1
1 ×i≥3 ci be the continue action profile of all players but
Player 2. Since P (x̂δ,η) < cε, we have
γ2(σ
δ,η) + ε ≥ γ2(q2, x̂δ,η−2)
≥ (1− cε) · γ2(q2, C−2) + cε · 0.
Hence, for every q2 ∈ Q2,
γ2(q2, C−2) ≤ 1
1− cεγ2(σ
δ,η) +
ε
1− cε ,
and therefore, if cε <
ε
1+ε
then
γ(q2, C−2) ≤ γ2(σδ,η) + 3ε.
Since C−2 is a possible strategy of Players 1, 3, . . . , |I|, the min-max value of
Player 2 is bounded by her best response to C−2. The game Γ is positive and
recursive, and therefore
v2(Γ) ≤ max
{
0, γ2(x̂
δ,η) + 3ε
}
= γ2(σ
δ,η) + 3ε.
We conclude that if η < η′, cε <
ε
1+ε
, and every player i ∈ I cannot gain more
then ε by deviating from σδ,η to action ai ∈ Ai such that ai /∈ C ′2, than Player
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2 cannot gain more then 3ε by deviating from σδ,η, and it is a 3ε-equilibrium.
Note that if κ ∈ [1,∞) is a positive constant, and every player i ∈ I cannot
gain more then κε by deviating from σδ,η to action ai ∈ Ai such that ai /∈ C ′2,
then cε <
ε
1+ε
implies that Player 2 cannot gain more then 3κε by deviating
from σδ,η, since ε
1+ε
≤ κε
1+κε
.
Step 7: Constructing the almost stationary uniform 18ε-equilibrium
Let η′ be as defined in Step 6 and η < η′. Let δ < min
{
ε
3
,
pmin
2
(
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
)
,
p3min · ε
4|A|
}
and cε < min
{
ε
1 + ε
,
pmin
2
(
1− 1
|Q′|
√
2
)
,
p3min · ε
4|A|
}
. We will prove that ev-
ery player i ∈ I cannot gain more then 6ε by deviating from σδ,η to action
ai ∈ Ai such that ai /∈ C ′2, thus, together with Step 6, completing the proof.
Fix i ∈ I, and an action ai ∈ Ai such that ai /∈ C ′2. We will prove that
γ(ai, σ
δ,η
−i ) ≤ γ(σδ,η) + 6ε.
By definition, for every ai ∈ Ai
γ(ai, σ
δ,η
−i ) ≤ γ(ai, x̂δ,η−i ).
In Eq. (5) we found an upper bound to γ(ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ):
γ(ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ) ≤
χ({a3, a4} , (ai, x̂δ,η−i ))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ))
u(a) + ε.
We will use the equivalence of x̂δ,η and x̂δ. By Eq. (10)
χ({a3, a4} , (ai, x̂δ,η−i ))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂
δ,η
−i ))
u(a) + ε
=
χ({a3, a4} , (ai, x̂δ−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂δ−i))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x̂
δ
−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂δ−i))
u(a) + ε.
Using Eq. (7), We can switch between the games Γ and Γδ,0. Since 3δ < ε,
we get that
χ({a3, a4} , (ai, x̂δ−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂δ−i))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, (ai, x̂
δ
−i))
χ(A1, (ai, x̂δ−i))
u(a) + ε
≤ χ
δ,0({a3, a4} , (ai, x−i))
χδ,0(A1, (ai, x−i))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χδ,0(a, (ai, x−i))
χδ,0(A1, (ai, x−i))
u(a) + 2ε.
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We relate the result to γ(ai, x−i), through its lower bound presented in Eq.
(6):
χδ,0({a3, a4} , (ai, x−i))
χδ,0(A1, (ai, x−i))
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χδ,0(a, (ai, x−i))
χδ,0(A1, (ai, x−i))
u(a) + 2ε
≤ γ(ai, x−i) + 3ε.
Since the mixed action profile x is an equilibrium in the game Γ, we get that
γ(ai, x−i) + 3ε ≤ γ(x) + 3ε.
By the upper bound of γ(x), presented in Eq. (1), we get
γ(x) + 3ε ≤ χ
δ,0({a3, a4} , x)
χδ,0(A1, x)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χδ,0(a, x)
χδ,0(A1, x)
u(a) + 4ε.
We use Eq. (7), to switch again between the games Γ and Γδ,0
χδ,0({a3, a4} , x)
χδ,0(A1, x)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χδ,0(a, x)
χδ,0(A1, x)
u(a) + 4ε
≤ χ({a
3, a4} , x̂δ)
χ(A1, x̂δ)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x̂δ)
χ(A1, x̂δ)
u(a) + 5ε.
We use again the equivalence of x̂δ,η and x̂δ,η. By Eq. (10)
χ({a3, a4} , x̂δ)
χ(A1, x̂δ)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x̂δ)
χ(A1, x̂δ)
u(a) + 5ε
=
χ({a3, a4} , x̂δ,η)
χ(A1, x̂δ,η)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x̂δ,η)
χ(A1, x̂δ,η)
u(a) + 5ε.
By the lower bound of γ(x), presented in Eq. (2), we conclude that
χ({a3, a4} , x̂δ,η)
χ(A1, x̂δ,η)
u(a4) +
∑
a∈A˜1
χ(a, x̂δ,η)
χ(A1, x̂δ,η)
u(a) + 5ε ≤ γ(x̂δ,η) + 6ε.
By definition
γ(x̂δ,η) + 6ε = γ(σδ,η) + 6ε,
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and the result follows.
Note that the same is true for the symmetric case of Γ0,δα and P
0,1: for every
ε > 0 there exist δε, cε > 0, such that if δ < δε, α ∈ [0, 1], and the mixed
action x is a stationary equilibrium of Γ0,δα that satisfies 0 < P
0,1(x) < cε,
then the game Γ admits an almost stationary uniform ε-equilibrium.
4.5 NQL Games
In this section we study NQL games. These games are similar to general
quitting games that satisfy the second condition in Theorem 2.20. The fol-
lowing lemma was proven by Solan and Solan (2018, Section 3.2, Case 3).
This lemma claims that the limit of discount equilibria cannot be a continue
action, if the continue payoff is a witness of the best response matrix.
Lemma 4.14 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be a generic quitting game
whose best response matrix is not a Q-matrix. Let q ∈ R|I| be a witness for
this matrix. Denote by Γ(q) = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) the quitting game that
it similar to Γ, except that the non-absorbing payoff is q; that is, u(c) := q.
For every λ > 0, let xλ be a λ-discounted stationary equilibrium of Γ(q).
Then limλ→0 x
λ is absorbing in Γ(q).
We will prove a similar version of this lemma, which claims that the limit
of undiscounted equilibria in the auxiliary games cannot be the action profile
a1.
Lemma 4.15 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be an NQL game. Let δ :
N → [0, 1]2 \ {(0, 0)} be a function such that limn→∞ δ(n) = ~0. Let (xn)n∈N
be a converging sequence of mixed action profiles such that xn is a stationary
equilibrium in the auxiliary game Γδ(n) for every n ∈ N, and define x∞ :=
limn→∞ x
n. Then, x∞ 6= a1.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that x∞ = a1.
Step 1: Defining auxiliary games
Since limn→∞ δ(n) = ~0, there exists a sequence M := {mn}∞n=1 of natural
numbers, that satisfies one of the following conditions:
(M1) The two sequences {δ1(mn)}∞n=1 and {δ2(mn)}∞n=1 are strictly decreasing
and positive. That is, for every n < n′ ∈ N, we have 0 < δ1(mn′) <
δ1(mn) and 0 < δ2(mn′) < δ2(mn).
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(M2) The sequence {δ1(mn)}∞n=1 is strictly decreasing and positive, while
δ2(m) = 0 for every m ∈ M.
(M3) The sequence {δ2(mn)}∞n=1 is strictly decreasing and positive, while
δ1(m) = 0 for every m ∈ M.
Condition (M3) is symmetric to condition (M2), hence we assume without
loss of generality that we have a subsequence M ⊆ N of infinity size that
satisfies either condition (M1) or condition (M2).
Let ΓM = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P
M, uM) be the quitting game defined as fol-
lows:
• PM(a) = 1 for every a 6= a1, a2 ∈ A, and PM(a1) = 0,
• If M satisfies Condition (M1): PM(a2) = 1, and uM = u0.5,0.5,
• If M satisfies Condition (M2): PM(a2) = 0, and uM = u0.5,0.
By Observation 4.6, the best response matrices of ΓM coincide with the best
response matrices of Γδ(m) for every m ∈M. Consequently, the game ΓM is
NQL game.
Step 2: Representing limm→∞ u
δ(m)(xm)
Recall that P δ(m)(xm) is the probability under the strategy profile xm that the
auxiliary game Γδ(m) terminates in a single stage. For every action profile a ∈
A, let z(a) := limm→∞
xm(a) · P δ(m)(a)
P δ(m)(xm)
be the limit probability of absorption
by action profile a under xm. We claim that
lim
m→∞
uδ(m)(xm) =
∑
i∈I
∑
qi∈Qi
z(qi, a
1
−i) · u(qi, a1−i) + (11)
+(z(c21, c
1
2, a
1
−1,2) + z(c
1
1, c
2
2, a
1
−1,2)
+z(c21, c
2
2, a
1
−1,2)) · u(a4).
To show that Eq. (11) holds, we recall that
uδ(m)(xm) =
∑
a∈A
xm(a) · P δ(m)(a) · u(a)
P δ(m)(xm)
. (12)
We will show that z(a) = 0 for every action profile a 6∈ {(qi, a1−i)}qi∈Qi ∪
{a2, a3, a4}. Let then a be such an action profile, and let i1, . . . , ik be the
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players such that aij ∈ Qij is a quitting action. We can assume without loss of
generality that (i1, ai1) 6= (1, c21), (2, c22). Then ai1 ∈ Qi1 and P δ(m)(a1−i1 , ai1)
is independent of m and δ. Because x∞ = a1 is non-absorbing in Γδ(m), for
every i ∈ {i1, ...ik}, we have limm→∞ xmi (ai) = 0. Hence,3
xm(a1−i1,...,−ik , ai1 , . . . , aik) · P δ(m)(a1−i1,...,−ik , ai1 , . . . , aik) ≤
≤ xm(a1−i1,...,−ik , ai1, . . . , aik)≪ xm(a1−i1 , ai1) · P δ(m)(a1−i1 , ai1).
It follows that xm(a1−i1,...,−ik , ai1 , . . . , aik) ≪ xm(a1−i1, ai1), and the claim fol-
lows.
Step 3: Constructing best response action profiles
Since xm is a stationary equilibrium in Γδ(m), and since x∞ = a1, for every
player i and every action ai 6= a1i ∈ Ai, if xmi (ai) > 0 for every large enoughm,
then ai is a best response against a
1
−i in the game Γ
δ(m). Therefore, for every
player i ∈ I who satisfies P δ(m)(xmi , a1−i) > 0 for everym sufficient large, every
action profile yi that assigns a positive probability only to actions ai ∈ Ai
that satisfy xmi (ai) > 0 (for every m sufficiently large), is a best response to
a1−i in Γ
M, since they have the same best response matrices.
We now define such a mixed action profile, y. For every player i 6= 1,
yi(ai) := lim
m→∞
xmi (ai) · P δ(m)(ai, a1−i)
P δ(m)(xmi , a
1
−i)
.
Thus, yi represents the proportion probability of the player to quit with a
specific action. For Player 1, we increase the probability to play the action
c21 by an amount that depends on the probability of the game to be absorb
in a4. If xm(a4) > 0 then xm1 (c
2
1) > 0 and x
m
2 (c
2
2) > 0. Let P
δ(m)
1,2 (x
m) :=
xm(a4) · P δ(m)(a4)
P δ(m)(xm)
. Therefore, if P δ(m)(xm1 , a
1
−1) + P
δ(m)
1,2 (x
m) > 0 for every
m sufficient large, the following action profile is a best response of Player 1
3We denote f(δ)≪ g(δ) whenever limδ→0 f(δ)g(δ) = 0.
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against a1−1 in Γ
M:
y1(a1) =

lim
m→∞
xm1 (a1) · P δ(m)(a1, a1−1)
P δ(m)(xm1 , a
1
−1) + P
δ(m)
1,2 (x
m)
if a1 ∈ Q1,
lim
m→∞
xm1 (c
2
1) · P δ(m)(a3) + P δ(m)1,2 (xm)
P δ(m)(xm1 , a
1
−1) + P
δ(m)
1,2 (x
m)
if a1 = c
2
1,
0 if a1 = c
1
1.
Step 4: The contradiction
The matrix R := (ri)i∈I is a best response matrix in Γ
M, and therefore it is
not a Q-matrix. We will derive a contradiction by showing that the linear
complementary problem LCP(R, q) has a solution, for every q ∈ R|I|. Let
z := (z1, . . . , z|I|), where
zi :=

∑
q1∈Q1
y(q1, a
1
−i) + y(a
3) + y(a4), i = 1,∑
q2∈Q2
y(q2, a
1
−i) + y(a
2), i = 2,∑
qi∈Qi
y(qi, a
1
−i), i > 3.
If z1 = 0, define r
1 := ~0. Otherwise, define
r1 :=
∑
q1∈Q1
lim
m→∞
xm1 (q1) · P δ(m)(q1, a1−1)
P δ(m)(xm1 , a
1
−1) + P
δ(m)
1,2 (x
m)
· u(q1)
+ lim
m→∞
xm1 (c
2
1) · P δ(m)(a3) + P δ(m)1,2 (xm)
P δ(m)(xm1 , a
1
−1) + P
δ(m)
1,2 (x
m)
u(a4).
If z2 = 0, define r
2 := ~0. Otherwise, define
r2 :=
∑
q2∈Q2
lim
m→∞
xm2 (q2) · P δ(m)(q2, a1−2)
P δ(m)(xm2 , a
1
−2)
· u(q2)
+ lim
m→∞
xm2 (c
2
2) · P δ(m)(a2)
P δ(m)(xm2 , a
1
−2)
u(a2).
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For every player i 6= 1, if zi = 0, define ri := ~0. Otherwise, define
ri :=
∑
qi∈Qi
lim
m→∞
xmi (qi) · P δ(m)(qi, a1−i)
P δ(m)(xmi , a
1
−i)
· u(qi).
Set w := limm→∞ uδ(m)(x
m) to be the limit payoff under xm. Since the game
is positive, w ∈ R|I|+ . We note that:
(Q1) w = Rz,
(Q2) z is a probability distribution: zi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ I, and
∑|I|
i=1 zi = 1,
(Q3) wi ≥ Ri,i for every i ∈ I,
(Q4) if zi > 0 then wi = Ri,i for every i ∈ I.
Indeed, Condition (Q1) is given by Eq. (12). Condition (Q2) follows from the
definitions. Conditions (Q3) and (Q4) hold by the definition of equilibrium:
for every δ sufficient small and for every i ∈ I, player i cannot gain more
than the equilibrium payoff while quitting alone, since the quitting probabil-
ity of all other players is small, and quitting alone is an option for player i
in the game. If zi > 0, then player i quits with a positive probability and he
is indifferent between quitting alone and the equilibrium payoff. Conditions
(Q1)-(Q4) imply that R is a Q-matrix, a contradiction.
The next lemma asserts that if the limit of a sequence of stationary equi-
libria is absorbing in a sequence of games, then the limit is an equilibrium in
the limit game. The claim is similar to Lemma 4 of Vrieze and Thuijsman
(1989), hence its proof is omitted.
Lemma 4.16 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be an NQL game. Let δ :
N → [0, 1]2 \ {(0, 0)} be a function such that limn→∞ δ(n) = ~0. Let (xn)n∈N
be a converging sequence of mixed action profiles such that xn is a stationary
equilibrium in the auxiliary game Γδ(n) for every n ∈ N, and set x∞ :=
limn→∞ x
n. If x∞ is absorbing in Γ, that is, P (x∞) > 0, then x∞ is a
stationary uniform 0-equilibrium of Γ.
The following theorem, presented original by Browder (1960) will be help-
ful during Lemma 4.18.
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Theorem 4.17 (Browder, 1960) Let X ⊆ Rn be a convex and compact
set, and let F : [0, 1] × X → X be a continuous function. Define CF :=
{(t, x) ∈ [0, 1] × X : x = f(t, x)} be the set of fixed points of f . There is a
connected component T of CF such that T∩({0}×X) 6= ∅ and T∩({1}×X) 6=
∅.
In the notations of Browder’s Theorem, by Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem,
every set-valued function F : X → X with non-empty and convex values and
closed graph has at least one fixed point. Browder’s Theorem states that
when the set-valued function F depends continuously on a one-dimensional
parameter whose range is [0, 1], the set of fixed points, as a function of the
parameter, has a connected component whose projection to the set of pa-
rameters is [0, 1].
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section: every NQL
game admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
Lemma 4.18 Let Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Qi)i∈I , P, u) be an NQL game. Then for
every ε > 0, the game Γ admits an almost stationary uniform ε-equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 2.14, we can assume without loss of generality that Γ is
a generic game. Fix ε > 0.
Step 1: Construction of a continuous game-valued function
Since the game Γ is an NQL game, the best response matrices of the games
Γ1,1, Γ1,00 , and Γ
0,1
0 are not Q-matrices. Let q, q1 and q2 be witnesses of these
matrices (respectfully). Denote Θ := [−1, 2], Ω := (0, 1], and Q := {q, q1, q2}.
For every θ ∈ Θ and every ω ∈ Ω, define
Γω,θ(Q) :=

Γω,01+θ(−θq1 + (1 + θ)q), θ ∈ [−1, 0],
Γθω,(1−θ)ω(q), θ ∈ [0, 1],
Γ0,ω2−θ((θ − 1)q2 + (2− θ)q), θ ∈ [1, 2].
The function (ω, θ) 7→ Γω,θ(Q) maps an auxiliary game to each pair of pa-
rameters (ω, θ) ∈ Ω × Θ. This function is continuous, in the sense that the
absorption function and the payoff function change continuously with ω and
θ. For every ω ∈ Ω, in the game Γω,−1(Q) Player 2 cannot play the action c22.
As θ increases from −1 to 0, the probability by which Player 2 can play the
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c12 c
2
2 (≤ 1 + θ) q2
c11 −θq + (1 + θ)q1 −θq + (1 + θ)q1 *
c21 u(a
4) ω* u(a4) * *
q1 * * *
−1 ≤ θ ≤ 0
c12 c
2
2 q2
c11 q u(a
4) (1−θ)ω* *
c21 u(a
4) θω* u(a4) * *
q1 * * *
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
c12 c
2
2 q2
c11 (2−θ)q+(θ−1)q2 u(a4) ω* *
c21 (≤ 2− θ) (2−θ)q+(θ−1)q2 u(a4) * *
q1 * * *
1 ≤ θ ≤ 2
Figure 5: The auxiliary games Γω,θ(Q) for θ ∈ [−1, 0] (top), for θ ∈ [0, 1]
(middle), and for θ ∈ [1, 2] (bottom).
action c22 in the game Γω,θ(Q) increases to 1, yet this action does not guar-
antee absorption. As θ increases from 0 to 1, the probability of absorption
under a2 (respectively a3) increases to ω (respectively decreases to 0). As θ
increases from 1 to 2, the probability by which Player 1 can play the action
c21 decreases from 1 to 0. The non-absorbing payoff changes with θ as well:
As θ increases to 0, it changes linearly from q2 to q; as θ increases from 0 to
1, it remains q; and as θ increases from 1 to 2, it changes linearly from q to q1.
Step 2: Applying Browder’s Theorem
For every λ > 0, every ω ∈ Ω, and every θ ∈ Θ, let Ξλω(θ) be the set of all
λ-discounted stationary equilibria of the auxiliary game Γω,θ(Q). Fix for a
moment ω ∈ Ω and λ > 0. Define Mλω :=
{
(θ, ξ(θ) | θ ∈ Θ, ξ(θ) ∈ Ξλω(θ)
}
.
Browder (1960) implies that the set Mλω has a connected component whose
projection to the first coordinate is Θ. Denote this connected component by
Mλω .
Define M0ω := lim supλ→0M
λ
ω = ∩λ>0∪λ′<λMλ′ω , and M00 := lim supω→0M0ω =
∩ω>0 ∪ω′<ω M0ω′ . The sets (Mλω )λ,ω, (M0ω)ω, and M00 are all semi-algebraic
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sets, hence the sets (M0ω)ω are connected and their projection to the first
coordinate is Ω. Consequently, the same holds for the set M00 .
Step 3: Notations
Since (M0ω)ω and M
0
0 are connected sets whose projection to the first coordi-
nate is Ω, there exist continuous semi-algebraic functions (θ0ω)ω, θ
0
0 : [0, 1]→
Θ, and (ξ0ω)ω, ξ
0
0 : [0, 1]→ (×i∈I∆(Ai)), such that
(a) the image θ00 and θ
0
ω for every ω ∈ Ω is Θ,
(b) (θ00(β), ξ
0
0(β)) ∈M0ω for every β ∈ [0, 1],
(c) (θ0ω(β), ξ
0
ω(β)) ∈M0ω for every β ∈ [0, 1] and every ω ∈ Ω.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that for every ω ∈ Ω we have
θ0ω(0), θ
0
0(0) = −1 and θ0ω(1), θ00(1) = 2. Denote by Γ(ω, β) the auxiliary
game Γω,θω(β)(Q).
We divide the interval [0, 1] into smaller intervals, which represent the differ-
ent type of the auxiliary game admitted by Γ(ω, β). This is done as follows.
Define recursively
τ1 := −1,
ρi := inf
({
β | β > τi, 0 < θ00(β) < 1
} ∪ {1}) ,
τi+1 := inf
{
β | β > ρi, θ00(β) /∈ (0, 1)
}
.
The definition ends when ρi = 1.
Since θ00(·) is a semi-algebraic function, it enters the interval (0, 1) finitely
many times. Therefore, there is an integer i ∈ N such that ρi = 1. If
β ∈ (ρi, τi+1), then for small enough ω, the auxiliary game Γ(ω, β) has the
structure of the game Γδ1,δ2 , where δ1 = θω(β) · ω and δ2 = (1 − θω(β)) · ω.
If β ∈ (τi, ρi), then for small enough ω, the auxiliary game Γ(ω, β) has the
structure of either the game Γδ,0α or the game Γ
0,δ
α , for some δ and α.
Step 4: Properties of ξ00(β) for ρi ≤ β ≤ τi+1
By the definition of τ and ρ, if ρi < β < τi+1 then 0 < θ
0
0(β) < 1, and Γ(ω, β)
is Γδ1,δ2, with δ1 = θω(β) · ω and δ2 = (1− θω(β)) · ω. If β ∈ {ρi, τi+1}, then
θ00(β) ∈ {0, 1}, and the auxiliary game Γ(ω, β) is either Γδ,0 or Γ0,δ, for some
δ > 0. We will present some properties of both ξ0ω and ξ
0
0 in these cases.
Lemma 4.14 implies the following.
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Claim 4.19 For every ω ∈ (0, 1], if ρi < β < τi+1 then ξ0ω(β) is absorbing
in Γ(ω, β).
From Claim 4.19 we deduce that ξ0ω(β) is an equilibrium in Γ(ω, β) for every
ω > 0. Since limω→0 ξ
0
ω(β) = ξ
0
0(β), using Lemma 4.15 we obtain the following
result
Claim 4.20 For every ρi < β < τi+1, we have ξ
0
0(β) 6= a1.
As the following claim asserts, Claim 4.20 extends to β = ρi and β = τi+1.
Claim 4.21 ξ00(ρi), ξ
0
0(τi+1) 6= a1.
Proof. We will argue that ξ00(ρi) 6= a1; the proof for ξ00(τi+1) is analo-
gous. Since ξ0ω(β) is an equilibrium in Γ(ω, β) for every ω > 0 and every
ρi < β < τi+1, limω→0+ ξ
0
ω(ρi + ω) = ξ
0
0(ρi), the result follows from Lemma
4.15.
Since ξ00(β) 6= a1 for every ρi ≤ β ≤ τi+1, Claims 4.20 and 4.21, together
with Lemma 4.16, yields the following.
Claim 4.22 For every ρi ≤ β ≤ τi+1, if ξ00(β) is absorbing in Γ, then Γ
admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
It is left to handle the case where ξ00(β) = (1 − tβ)a1 + tβa2 or ξ00(β) =
(1− tβ)a1+ tβa3, for every β ∈ [ρi, τi+1], where tβ > 0. The interval [ρi, τi+1]
is called a type 1 interval if ξ00(β) = (1− tβ)a1 + tβa2 for every β ∈ [ρi, τi+1].
The interval [ρi, τi+1] is called a type 2 interval if ξ
0
0(β) = (1 − tβ)a1 + tβa3
for every β ∈ [ρi, τi+1]. We argue that the interval [ρi, τi+1] is either a type
1 interval or a type 2 interval. Indeed, otherwise, there are β, β ′ ∈ [ρi, τi+1],
such that ξ00(β) = (1 − tβ)a1 + tβa2 and ξ00(β ′) = (1 − tβ′)a1 + tβa3. The
continuity of ξ implies that one of the following two conditions holds:
(ι) ξ00(β
′′) = a1 for some β ′′ ∈ [ρi, τi+1],
(ιι) ξ00(β
′′) is absorbing in the game Γ for some β ′′ ∈ [ρi, τi+1].
The former alternative is impossible due to Claim 4.20, while by Claim 4.22,
the latter alternative implies that the game Γ admits an almost stationary
ε-equilibrium. It follows that it is left to handle the case where [ρi, τi+1] is
either a type 1 interval or a type 2 interval.
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Step 5: Properties of ξ00(β) where τi ≤ β ≤ ρi
By the definition of τ and ρ, if τi ≤ β ≤ ρi then either θ00(β) ≤ 0, in
which case Γ(ω, β) = Γω,0α for some α ∈ [0, 1]; or θ00(β) ≥ 1, in which case
Γ(ω, β) = Γ0,δα for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Claim 4.23 There exists c′ε > 0, such that for every β ∈ [0, 1], if θ00(β) ≤ 0
and 0 < P 0,1(ξ00(β)) < c
′
ε, then Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
Proof. Let cε, δε > 0 be given by Lemma 4.13, and set c
′
ε :=
cε
2
. If
0 < P 0,1(ξ00(β)) < c
′
ε, then there are β
′ close to β and ω < δε, such that
0 < P 0,1(ξ0ω(β
′)) < cε. The result follows from Lemma 4.13.
An analogous result holds when θ00(β) ≥ 1.
Claim 4.24 There exist cε > 0, such that for every β ∈ [0, 1], if θ00(β) ≥ 1
and 0 < P 1,0(ξ00(β)) < cε, then the game Γ admits an almost stationary
ε-equilibrium.
Claim 4.25 Let β, β ′ ∈ [τi, ρi]. If there are t, t′ ∈ (0, 1] such that ξ00(β) =
(1−t)a1+ta2 and ξ00(β ′) = (1−t′)a1+t′a3, then Γ admits an almost stationary
ε-equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, θ00(β
′′) ≤ 0 for every β ′′ ∈ [τi, ρi]. We
know that P 0,1(ξ00(β)) > 0 and P
0,1(ξ00(β
′)) = 0. By the intermediate value
theorem, there is β ′′ between β and β ′, such that 0 < P 0,1(ξ00(β)) < c
′
ε. The
result follow from Claim 4.23.
We deduce from Claim 4.25 that if [ρi, τi+1] is a type 1 interval (and therefore
ξ00(τi+1) = (1− t)a1+ ta2, for some t > 0), and [ρi+1, τi+2] is a type 2 interval,
(and therefore ξ00(ρi+1) = (1 − t′)a1 + t′a3, for some t′ > 0), then Γ admits
an almost stationary ε-equilibrium. Hence, it left to handle the case where
all intervals [ρi, τi+1] have the same type.
Step 6: The connected component ends
Without loss of generality, assume that all intervals [ρi, τi+1] have type 1.
Then, ξ00(ρ1) = (1 − t)a1 + ta2 (where t > 0), and hence P 0,1(ξ00(ρ1)) = 0.
If ξ00(0) is not a mixture of a
1 and a2, then P 0,1(ξ00(0)) > 0. Therefore, for
every c > 0, there is β ∈ [τ1, ρ1] such that 0 < P 0,1(ξ00(β)) < c. By Claim
4.23, the game Γ admits an almost stationary ε-equilibrium.
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If ξ00(0) is a mixture of a
1 and a2, then, since θ00(0) = −1, we deduce that
ξ00(0) = a
1. We will prove that this case is not possible, and conclude the
proof. As in Claim 4.19, one can show that ξ0ω(0) 6= a1 for every ω >
0. Therefore ξ0ω(0) are equilibria in Γ(ω, 0) for every ω > 0. The game
limω→0 Γ(ω, 0) is a general quitting game with a single player who has two
continue actions, while the other players have a single continue action. Since
limω→0 ξ
0
ω(0) = a
1, this is a contradiction, as in Claim 4.21.
4.6 Uniform Sunspot ε-equilibrium
In this section we prove Lemma 4.1, which state that every positive recursive
L-shaped game admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium, thus completing the
proof of Theorem 2.26.
Proof. Let ε > 0, and let Γ be an L-shaped game. Γ is either NQL game
or QL game. If Γ is an NQL game, then then by Lemma 4.18, it admits an
almost uniform ε-equilibrium. If Γ is a QL game, then by Lemma 4.10, it
admits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium.
5 Discussion
The problem that inspired this paper is whether every stochastic game ad-
mits a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium. Solan and Solan (2018) proved that
every general quitting game admits such an equilibrium, and in this paper,
we proved the result to another family of absorbing games. To do so, we
developed two techniques that were used in this paper.
The first technique, which was introduced in Section 3, consists of dividing
the set of non-absorbing mixed action profiles to equivalence classes. Two
mixed action profiles, x and y, are in the same equivalence class if there is i
such that x−i = y−i. In spotted games, each equivalence class is composed
of a single action profile. We then considered, for each equivalence class, an
auxiliary game where all mixed action profiles that do not belong to that class
are absorbing. We then showed that a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in such
an auxiliary game, in which the players play mainly a non-absorbing mixed
action profile is a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in the original game. We
also proved that if all these auxiliary games do not admit a uniform sunspot
ε-equilibrium, in which the players play mainly a non-absorbing mixed ac-
tion profile, then a uniform absorbing stationary 0-equilibrium exists. The
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second technique, which was introduced in Section 4, consists of two fami-
lies of auxiliary games, where the limit of λ-discounted ε-equilibrium in the
auxiliary games allow us to explore and find uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium
in the original game.
We believe that by combining these two techniques, one can proved the exis-
tence of a uniform sunspot ε-equilibrium in more general families of absorb-
ing games, specifically in quitting absorbing games, that were introduced in
Definition 2.21.
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